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THE IDEA OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND ITS PROBLEMS
Eugene E. Selk
Department of Philosophy
Creighton University
Omaha, Nebraska 68178

Recently the problem of scientific progress has been one of the
most widely discussed topics among historians and philosophers of
science. But little has been said on the problem of technological progress. I suggest that theories of technological progress can be divided,
fIrst, into cognitive and non-cognitive; then cognitive can be subdivided
into cumulative and problem-solving; non-cognitive can be divided into
material well-being and moral and spiritual well-being. After examining
different versions of the cumulative theory, I conclude that technology
is not intrinsically cumulative; whether technology is cumulatively
progressive is a matter of goals extrinsic to technology. I argue that
Laudan's recent problem-solving theory of scientific progress seems to
fIt technology exceptionally well; but this notion of progress turns out
to be rather emaciated. The material well-being model of technological
progress is the position that technology can endow human life with
"new inventions and riches." This model raises many thorny problems
concerning what constitutes man's material well-being. Finally, the
moral and spiritual well-being model states that technology can improve
man's ability to achieve moral and spiritual goals; but what these goals
are varies widely from position to position. My general conclusion is
that technology does not, with two exceptions which are minimal,
contain any intrinsic direction toward betterment. I then briefly note
some implications of this conclusion.

play a dominant role in science. Since these presuppositions
were time-rooted, the new approach emphasized the history
of science; and the examination of the history of science
inevitably led to inquiry into the progress of science.
The emphasis on the importance of presuppositions in
determining the problems which scientists address as well as
the types of solutions which they find acceptable inevitably
led to a dilemma: If scientists are always approaching the
world with conceptual frameworks (or if one prefers, paradigms or traditions), then how can discovery take place? If
scientists look at the world according to their mental sets, how
can they ever see anything new? Moreover, when a discovery
is made, what standards determine whether it is acceptable?
The appeal to observation and experiment is no longer acceptable as an answer to this question because observation and
experiment are themselves conditioned by a conceptual framework. What, then, justifies the claim that one theory is progressive over its predecessor? In brief, the turn away from the
positivist emphasis on timeless and universal meanings and
structures and toward time-rooted Weltanschauungen inevitably led to the problem of scientific progress. The literature on
this topic has been voluminous beginning with Hanson (1958),
later Kuhn (1970), and most recently Laudan (1977).

t t t
INTRODUCTION
The liveliest topic of discussion in the philosophy of
science in the past decade has been on the nature of scientific
progress. The focus on this problem marks a striking change
from the beginnings of the professionalization of the philosophy of science in the 1920s. The Logical Positivist approach
toward the philosophy of science consisted in the attempt to
find, by detailed logical analysis, the timeless and universal
meanings and structures of all scientific knowledge (e.g.,
the meaning of "law," "causality," "probability," and the
pattern of validation, the logical structure of scientific theories). This approach regarded the psychology of scientific
discovery and the evolution of scientific concepts as largely
irrelevant to an understanding of the scientific enterprise.
Beginning in the late 1950s, the positivist approach to science
came under increasing attack. The assault was led by Hanson
(1958), Kuhn (1970), Toulmin (1953), and Bohm (1957),
and it was based primarily on the thesis that presuppositions

This voluminous literature on the problem of scientific
progress has not been matched by inquiry into the idea of
technological progress. A large literature does exist on effects
of technology on society and on economic growth; but this
sort of inquiry is very different from investigation into the
idea of technological progress.
Just as the issue of scientific progress is closely related to
some other significant issues -i.e., the rationality of science
and the concept of truth in science -so also the issue of technological progress has significant implications. Perhaps the
most important one is the means-use model of technology.
This model states that technology is a neutral means; whether
it is used for good or evil purposes is not a matter of the
nature of technology itself, but rather how man uses it. After
225
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examining the problem of technological progress, I shall conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of the position I adopt on this means-use model.

progress, and, accordingly, we shall first examine that verSion
of the theory. We shall then turn to technology and explore
the possibility of applying the model to that area.

In discussing the idea of technological progress, I shall lay
out different models of technological progress. The emphasis
shall be on constructing the logical possibilities, rather than on
a historical survey of positions which have actually been taken
on the progress of technology. However, as a touchstone for
assembling and analyzing various logical possibilities, I shall
frequently discuss some of the most important historical
theories.

The classic defense of the cumulative model of scientific
progress was offered by Francis Bacon (in Warhaft, 1965). He
argued that for the first time in history it was possible for
knowledge to march steadily toward unlocking the secrets of
nature. What was the basis of this claim? The key for Bacon
was method:

Before beginning this inquiry, it will be helpful to engage
in a brief analysis of the idea of progress. Van Doren (1967),
in his exhaustive study of the idea of progress, suggests that
the core residue of meaning which can be extracted from writings on progress includes at least three ideas: (1) a pattern of
change; (2) which is, in the long run, irreversible; and (3)
which is directed toward an advance in value, toward that
which is better (Van Doren, 1967:3). Progress is a pattern of
change, but it is more than that. It is change in the direction
of improvement. In addition, a theory of progress need not
claim that progress is change which is always moving in a
straight line toward improvement. Obviously, such a requirement would rule out progress in anything. Progress, rather, is
change which is moving in one direction, toward betterment,
for the most part and over the long run.
Finally, a note is in order on the classificatory scheme
which I shall use in this paper. Models of technological and
scientific change seem to fall into two general groupings:
cognitive and non-cognitive. The tag "normative" might be
used instead of non-cognitive, but I have avoided this because
some might claim, and I would tend to agree with them, that
cognitive theories also contain many normative elements.
Cognitive models are those which claim that technology
is progressing because in some way it is growing in knowledge.
In this category, I shall discuss two models: cumulative and
problem-solving. Non-cognitive models are those which claim
that technology is progressing because it is moving ~oward
some normative goal. There appear to be two principal types
of non-cognitive models: the material well-being model, and
the moral and spiritual well-being model.
COGNITIVE MODELS
OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS

There are and can be only two ways of searching into
and discovering truth. The one flies from the senses
and particulars to the most general axioms .... And
this way is now in fashion. The other derives axioms
from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual
and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most
general axioms last of all. This is the true way, but
as yet untried (Bacon, in Warhaft, 1965 :333).
Bacon went on, of course, and elaborated considerably on this
idea of a reformed, inductive method. But his great idea was
that he had discovered the scientific method, and that if this
method is applied carefully and consistently, it will guarantee
the progress of scientific knowledge-i.e., the movement of
knowledge toward the truth.
Some of the sharpest statements on the cumulative theory
of scientific progress were made by the nineteenth century
American Pragmatist, Charles Sanders Peirce, and his statement of the theory may serve as a summary of the position
(in Hartshorne and Weiss, 1935 :23).
Science is to mean for us a mode of life whose single
animating purpose is to find out the real truth, which
pursues this purpose by a well-considered method,
founded on thorough acquaintance with such scientific results already ascertained by others as may be
available, and which seeks cooperation in the hope
that the truth may be found, if not by any of the
actual inquirers, yet ultimately by those who come
after them and who shall make use of their results.
And in a marvelously vivid metaphor, Peirce (in Hartshorne
and Weiss, 1935 :4) summarizes this idea:
The idea of science is to pile the ground before the
foot of the outworks of truth with the carcasses of
this generation and perhaps others to come after it,
until some future generation, by treading on them,
can storm the citadel.

1. The Cumulative Model
The theory of technological progress which has the greatest weight of tradition behind it is the cumulative model.
This theory has its roots in the cumulative theory of scientific

In sum, the essentials of the cumulative theory of scientific progress are the following. Scientific knowledge is steadily
moving toward the truth, or an increasing approximation of
reality, and it is doing so because of scientific method. Man
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has been accumulating knowledge for centuries, but only since
the Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries has mankind discovered the proper method for
investigating nature. Scrupulous use of this method shall lead
to a steady and irreversible uncovering of the secrets of nature.
What is significant about this theory for our purposes is that it
is an internal theory of progress. It is internal in two respects.
First, the essence of science is a method, which if used properly, will move knowledge toward an increasing understanding
of the physical world. This increased understanding, or if one
prefers, truth, is the second internal aspect of this theory of
progress. It suggests that it is part of the very meaning of
science to move toward tn/th, in the sense of the way things
really are.
While the cumulative theory of scientific progress continues to be defended widely, it is not without problems.
The weakest plank in the Baconian and Enlightenment notion
of scientific progress is the almost unquestioning faith in
method. For Bacon and many of the other defenders of this
theory, scientific method was conceived in almost purely
mechanical terms. Data are collected, and hypotheses extrapolated from the data are then tested by observation and
experiment. The belief was that if the rules were followed
properly, truth would be nearly guaranteed. The criticisms of
this conception of scientific method are well known and need
not be repeated here. It will suffice to note that Bacon and
the other defenders of this conception of method underestimated the illogical character of the origin of scientific
hypotheses. Hypotheses, the sine qua non of scientific inquiry,
cannot be cranked out in some mechanical fashion. They
seem to require insight or creative imagination which is ultimately not reducible to rational analysis or to a set of logical
rules. But we may grant that a more sophisticated theory of
method could be compatible with the cumulative theory
of scientific progress.
In addition to the problem of method, there are also the
perennial epistemological critiques of the cumulative view.
These critiques center on the concept of truth and reality and
ask a cluster of vexing questions: How can we know whether
science is approaching the truth? If truth is taken in the sense
of the way things really are, how can we ever know this
dimension of reality? Are we in contact only with our experiences of reality? This is not the place to take up these
classical philosophical questions. But I would like to defend
brietly the soundness of the notion that science is a quest for
and a movement toward truth, since this claim will be central
to my conclusion to this section.
The history of science indicates that many, and perhaps
even most, of the discoveries in science sooner or later find
practical application. In fact, Jonas (1976: 15-17) argued that
this has become increasingly the case in the twentieth century.
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The only exceptions to this phenomenon seem to be theories
of cosmogony (e.g., the big-bang) and some areas of particle
physics. This suggests that if a scientific theory is at least
partially true, it has at least some capacity to generate technological or other concrete applications. Conversely, if some
scientific principle is found to result in useful technology, then
in some aspect or another it embodies a truth about the
world (Quay, 1974: 160). [n brief, the fact that a body of
scientific knowledge has concrete applications is one of the
tests of the truth of that knowledge. Thus, there does seem to
be some basis for claiming that scientific knowledge is moving
toward truth.
We shall now turn to the central question for our purposes: Can the cumulative model of scientific progress, or
some modified version of it, be applied to technology? At first
glance, it would appear that it is nonsensical to talk about
technology as moving toward an increasing understanding of
the physical world, or of moving toward the truth. This would
appear to be a fundamental difference between scientific
and technological progress. Scientific progress is at least in
some sense, as we just argued, a progressive movement toward
a greater understanding of the physical world. Technology, by
contrast, is not directed toward truth or understanding the
world. Technology deals with the world of created devices
and techniques, and these do not have to "fit" reality, except
in the trivial sense that they cannot disobey the laws of nature
(e.g., the technologist cannot build a rocket which travels
faster than the speed of light). If there is any sense of truth in
technology, it is Vico's notion of ven/m factum -man can
have certain knowledge of his creations because he has made
them. But this notion of truth, unless one is an unvarnished
idealist, is very different from the notion of truth in science.
Thus, at first look, it does not appear that there is technological progress in the sense of a step-by-step movement
toward the truth.
But the situation is a bit more complicated than this.
The history of science and technology is filled with instances
of technological devices aiding in science's quest for unravelling the secrets of nature. The most famous example of this is
Galileo's use of the telescope to make new astronomical
discoveries and to defend Copernicanism (albeit very indirectly). The electron microscope is an example of a technological
device which is based on scientific theory but which has also
contributed to the development of new theory. Shall we conclude, then, that there is cumulative technological progress
insofar as technology contributes to the movement toward
truth? This conclusion would be too sweeping. First, this
notion of technological progress is too limited in scope, for it
applies only to those technologies which have actually led to
new discoveries in science. But in the history of technology,
most technologies prior to the twentieth century were developed independently of science and had little if any influence
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on the development of science. For example, cheesemaking,
brewing, and metal-making were developed long before the
Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and had no apparent influence on that revolution. Thus,
we may conclude that some technologies have sometimes
aided science in its quest for an understanding of the universe.
But even here, the progress is not really technological progress
toward truth as much as it is scientific progress with the aid
of technology. Science is frequently parasitic with respect to
technology. In conclusion, there is no basis for claiming that
technology progresses in the sense that it moves toward the
truth.
But is there, then, some other notion of the cumulative
theory of technological progress? There are three remaining
possibilities: the quantitative increase of technology over time,
the increase in the power of technology, and the building of
one technology on another. In regard to the first possibility,
there has been an obvious increase in the number of technological devices and techniques in the West since approximately the sixth century. This movement began with the
stirrup, rotation of crops, the Saxon wheeled-plough, the horse
collar, and the crank, and moved on in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries to the steam-engine, telephone, camera,
electric lights, nuclear power-plants, and on and on. The
number of technological devices has probably been increasing exponentially since the Industrial Revolution.
But this increase is not only quantitative. It is also -and
this is the second remaining possibility - marked by a dramatic
increase in man's power over nature. Jonas (I 974: 13) regarded
the power which twentieth-century technology has given man
as so great that it has transformed human nature. Modern
technology, he argued, has created a "new type of human
action," one larger and more powerful than ever before.
The third remaining possibility for a cumulative theory
of technological progress is the notion that many technological
inventions are based on preceding technological devices or
processes. The history of technology is filled with illustrations
of this phenomenon. One brief case history constructed from
Cardwell (1972:66-69) and Pacey (1974: 120-129) will suffice
to demonstrate this point. In 1661, the German Otto von
Guericke constructed a device using a vertically-aligned piston
and cylinder to lift weights. Air was pumped out of the
cylinder causing the piston, under the force of atmospheric
pressure, to descend and to lift the weights. In 1673, Christian
Huygens and Denis Papin added a charge of gunpowder to von
Guericke's piston. Papin later refined this machine further by
using condensed steam to create a vacuum in the cylinder.
Finally, Thomas Newcomen and John Cawley took the idea of
the cylinder and piston which von Guericke, Huygens, and
Papin had developed, plus Papin's idea of creating a vacuum
by the condensation of steam, and added a mechanism for

turning valves on and off in the right sequence. Here is a clear
case, then, of the development of a technology by the bUild_
ing up of one invention on another.
Now is there any basis for claiming that any or all of
these types of accumulation-quantitative, in power, and
building up-are progressive? A few examples will illustrate
that the answer must be negative. Many large and complex
technological devices and techniques-large and complex
in size, power, and the degree to which they are built up
on simpler technologies-have brought with them effects
which are generally regarded as regressive. The airplane,
rockets, and conventional and atomic bombs have dramatically increased man's ability to wage devastating wars. The
factory system has dehumanized labor. Nuclear-power reactors
have generated large amounts of wastes which are difficult
to dispose of safely. Technology has also, admittedly, dramatically improved the human condition in many ways. But the
point of these examples is this: The cumulative movement of
technology-whether quantitative, in power, or in building
up-does not contain any intrinsic measure of progress.
From the cumulative point of view, whether technology
is progressive or regressive is a matter of extrinsic value
choices.
2. The Problem-Solving Model
In a recent work, Laudan (1977) developed an elaborate
theory of scientific progress which he called a "problemsolving model." Following our procedure in the previous section, we shall examine Laudan's theory of scientific progress
and then investigate whether this model might be applicable
to technology.
Laudan failed to offer a definition of what he meant by a
problem. Here he would have been well-advised to consult
Peirce's classic essay "The Fixation of Belief." Peirce (in Hartshorne and Weiss, 1934: 230) argued that all inquiry begins
with "an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle
to free ourselves." This psychological notion of uneasiness
and dissatisfaction may be taken as a good definition of a
problem.
To return to Laudan's model, he took as his central claim
that "science as a problem-solving system [is] ... what is
most characteristic about science ... ; the aim of science ...
is the resolution and clarification of problems ... " (Laudan,
1977: 12). To emphasize the unorthodox nature of this claim,
Laudan contrasted this position with the usual view that the
empirical scientist is primarily interested in "explaining" the
world of empirical facts. He argued that scientific theories are
not attempts to give high·order explanations of laws and facts,
but rather to provide solutions to problems. Not only did
Laudan wish to debunk the importance of facts in science,
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he also played down the importance of the role of "confirmation" and the notion of "truth" in science.
In appraising the merits of theories, it is more important to ask whether they constitute adequate solutions to significant problems than it is to ask whether
they are "true," "corroborated," "well confirmed,"
or otherwise justifiable within the framework of contemporary epistemology (Laudan, 1977: 12).
In determining whether a theory solves a problem, and
whether it is, accordingly, acceptable, Laudan claimed that "it
is irrelevant whether the theory is true or false, well or poorly
confirmed ... (Laudan, 1977:22-23). And further, " ... scientists generally do not consider matters of truth and falsity
when determining whether a theory does or does not solve a
particular empirical problem" (Laudan, 1977:24). Although
Laudan's critique of the orthodox notions of confirmation and
truth in science is based primarily on historical grounds, he
could not resist mentioning the traditional epistemological
difficulties with these notions:
We apparently do not have any way of knowing for
sure ... that science is true, or probable, or that it
is getting closer to the truth. Such aims are utopian,
in the literal sense that we can never know whether
they are being achieved (Laudan, 1977: 127).
The essential units of science, on Laudan's account, are
"research traditions." A research tradition is a "set of assumptions: assumptions about the basic kinds of entities in the
world, assumptions about how those entities interact, assumptions about the proper methods to use for construction and
testing theories about these entities" (Laudan, 1977:97).
Examples of research traditions are Aristotelianism, Cartesianism, Darwinism, Newtonianism, mechanistic biology, and
Freudian psychology. It should be emphasized that what are
ordinarily called scientific theories-e.g., Aristotle's theory of
astronomy, or molecular genetics-are, on Laudan's account,
components of research traditions. A research tradition may
be composed of multiple theories plus a methodology, experimentation, and even metaphysics. The main point for our
purposes is that, according to Laudan, research traditions
are the frameworks used to attack problems, and they are also
the problem-solutions.
Now what is progress within Laudan's theory of science?
Progress can occur on two levels: within research traditions or
between them. Progress within a research tradition is simply
any change in a theory, law, method, or experiment which
solves or comes closer to solving a problem within the tradition. To put the matter briefly and bluntly, progress is any
change which is in the direction of the solution of a problem.
But what about the relationship between research traditions?
Is there any way of knowing whether the replacement of one
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research tradition by another is progressive? Laudan argued
that because of their generality and because of their normative
elements, research traditions are not directly testable (Laudan,
1977 :81-82). But one research tradition is better than another
and thus is progressive if it "leads, via its component theories,
to the adequate solution of an increasing range of empirical
and conceptual problems" (Laudan, 1977 :82). But Laudan
emphasized again that such problem-solving success tells us
nothing about whether the tradition is "confirmed" or "refuted," or "true" or "false" (Laudan, 1977:82).
Before examining whether this model fits technological
progress, a few critical comments are in order. First, Laudan's
devaluation (he carefully noted that he was not totally rejecting
the concepts) of the notions of confirmation and truth do
not seem to be carried through consistently even in his own
elaboration of the model. Thus, for example, Laudan stated
that one theory is better than another if its predictions are
"tested," and if some of them are "borne out in our observation" (Laudan, 1977:67). Again, he argued that theories are
components of research traditions, and the successful test of
a theory is at the same time at least a partial test of the "adequacy" of a research tradition (Laudan, 1977 :82). But what
does Laudan mean by checking predictions and making observations unless some sort of encounter with reality? One need
not be a naive realist to accept that there is some sort of
reality out there which is pressing against our ideas and constantly checking and directing them, albeit the linkage between our ideas and reality may be very indirect. My point is,
in brief, that in the end I do not believe that Laudan can
escape using reality and truth as criteria for evaluating theories
and research traditions, and by that fact progress.
Laudan's assertion that the aim of science is problemsolving is also inadequate. Even if we grant that much or most
of science is concerned with problem-solving, this is at most
the immediate end of science. We may still ask: Problemsolving for what? Are scientists simply interested in resolving
the immediate puzzles at hand and nothing more? Why are
they even interested and motivated to seek solutions to
problems? The orthodox position on the ends of science seems
still to stand: The ultimate or highest goals of science are:
(1) either the desire to understand the world, or (2) the
desire to gain control over the world for the sake of improving
the human condition. Granted, the aim of understanding
the world may be an ideal limit which can never be attained.
Nevertheless, it does play a central role in scientific inquiry.
Laudan seems to deny that there are any "higher" or longrange motives behind the activity of the scientist.
The problem-solving model of progress may, in fact, fit
technology much better than science. Investigation of this
possibility will be our next task. If we use Peircc's notion of
a problem as an "uneasiness" or an "irritation" of the mind,
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then technological inquiry does indeed seem to begin in this
fashion. A case history will be useful for illustrating this claim
and for testing the applicability of the problem-solving model
to technology in general.
In 1712, Thomas Newcomen built a steam engine that
combined for the first time a piston-in-cylinder and a motive
principle which involved the formation of a vacuum within
the cylinder through the induced condensation of steam
(Usher, 1962:347-357; Sherer, 1965). In the winter of 17631764, James Watt, while repairing a model of the Newcomen
engine, was perplexed by the large amount of steam it used
(Usher, 1962 :353). Usher, a historian of technology, termed
this perplexity the first stage in the process of invention. He
called it the "perception of a problem," and defined a problem
as an "incomplete or unsatisfactory pattern," or "an unfulfilled want" (Usher, 1962:65).
Returning to the steam engine case-history, further investigation led Watt to realize that the inefficiency of the engine
was caused by two conflicting requirements: To utilize steam
efficiently, the cylinder had to be kept at 100 C; but to form
a vacuum for the power stroke, the cylinder had to be cooled
below 100 C (Sherer: 167). Usher (1962:65) called this the
second stage in the act of invention: "setting the stage."
In 1765, Watt suddenly had insight to solve the problem:
He would condense the engine's steam in a separate condensing container to which it would be drawn (Sherer, 1965:
170). This is the third stage, the sudden and dramatic "act
of insight," which seems to be so essential to creativity,
whether in the arts, sciences, or technology. We may also call
this stage, from the viewpoint of the problem-solVing model,
the solution to the problem. It is not a complete solution
because much mopping-up work always remains at this stage.
In fact, to return to Watt's invention, Watt spent fifteen years
(1765 to 1780) before he completed the development of his
new engine (Sherer, 1965: 176). He built, tested, modified, and
retested models of increasing scale and sophistication. Usher
(1962 :65) called this last stage "critical revision."
We may now add some other observations on the application of Laudan's problem-solving model to technology.
Laudan's claim that confirmation and truth play an insignificant role in science seems to be much more true of technology than of science. In technology, the question is not
whether the idea is confirmed or refuted, but whether it can
be carried out in practice. There is a type of testing here, but
it is not the testing of an idea against given-reality, but rather
of the idea against the made-reality, the artifact. Again, in
technology, the question is never whether a technological
device or process is true or false, but rather whether it fulfills the goals for which it was devised. As noted earlier, Vico's
formula vernm factum applies perfectly to technological

devices and processes. If we employ the correspondence
theory of truth, then we may say that a technological artifact
is true not because it conforms to reality, but because it conforms to the idea in the inventor's mind. Truth is made by
man. But, of course we are using truth here in a rather extended sense, and we may prefer simply to state that truth and
falsity have no place in technology.
We may conclude at this point that technology comes
closer than science to Laudan's problem-solVing model. But
the critical question remains: Is the problem-solving model a
sound theory of technological progress? The answer will not
be unequivocal and will require a distinction introduced by
Laudan (referred to above). Laudan made a distinction between (1) progress within a problem, and (2) progress in the
movement from one problem-solution to another (he referred
to research traditions). It does seem sound to assert that there
is technological progress in the first sense. There is progress
as the inventor moves from awareness of a problem to its
resolution through creation of a technological device or
process. Thus, here progress is simply movement in the direction of the solution of a specific problem.
There are some distinct advantages of such a theory of
technological progress. First, it has the value of concreteness
and precision. There is always something vague and troubling
about the notion of technology progressing toward truth, or
the material and spiritual well-being of mankind. Secondly,
the theory seems to be an intrinsic theory of progress. If
problem-solving is of the very essence of technology, then
there is a notion of progress internal to technology-namely,
the movement toward the solution of a problem.
But when all is said and done, this notion of technological
progress is very emaciated. When we speak of technological
progress in modern discourse, we are usually referring to longterm improvement of some sort. Can we say, under the
problem-solving model, that technology is moving toward
some sort of betterment as it moves from one problemsolution to another problem-solution? In short, is there any
way of determining whether technology progresses between
problem-solutions? Laudan (1977:78), speaking of scientific
progress, solved the problem of determining whether there is
progress between problem-solutions by appealing to such
criteria as the internal consistency of the theories within one
research tradition compared to the consistency of those within
a competing research tradition, the degree of generality of the
problem, the age of the problem, and the number of problems
which a theory solves. But none of these criteria appears to
be applicable to technological devices and processes. In technology, the fact that one problem-solution is regarded as more
significant than another seems to be a matter of historical
circumstance and cultural and personal choices. Thus, the fact
that the development of solar energy is regarded as a significant
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problem in the United States today is because of the depletion
of our domestic reserves of oil and our high degree of dependence on foreign oil. But these causes can be pushed back
another stage. Our need for oil at all is a result of our dependence on the automobile, modern air travel, elaborate industrial machinery, and so on. Similarly, the reason the atomic
bomb was regarded as important in 1944 was because it
offered a solution to the prolongation of the war. The alternative of bombing by conventional means and invading Japan
did not appear attractive after five years of warfare. On the
basis of the problem-solving model, therefore, there is nothing
in the structure of technology which can serve as a basis for
ci:<iming that the movement of technology from one problemsoi1.:tion to another problem-solution is progressive. The only
way \0 evaluate whether there is such a progression is by an
appeal\to extrinsic goals or values.

In sum, the problem-solving model does have this value:
It allows us to say that there is progress within a specific field

(or sub field) within relatively short periods of time - that is,
in the movement from the awareness of a problem to its
solution. But when we ask the broader question, "Is technology progressing?" the problem-solving model seems to be
of little help. The model does not contain any internal criterion for determining whether there is progress when we
move from one problem-solution to another problem-solution.

NON-COGNITIVE MODELS
OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
On the basis of our examination of the cumulative and
problem-solving models, we may draw the general conclusion
that the important question is not whether technology advances either in the cumulative sense or in the problem-solving
sense. The crucial question is whether technology advances
for the better-i.e., whether it is progressive. Is man's accumulation of technical devices and procedures and his piling up
of problem-solutions an advance toward betterment? We
concluded that there is nothing in the internal structure of
technology which can serve as a basis for claiming that technology is progressive, except in the very limited sense of the
movement toward the solution of a specific problem.
We shall now tum to non-cognitive theories of technological progress-i.e., theories which do not define progress in
terms of an increase in knowledge. Traditionally, two general
non-cognitive goals of technology have been defended: an
improvement in the material well-being of man, and an
improvement in the moral and spiritual well-being of man.

1. Material Well-being
Bacon is again the locus classicus for this model. We have
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already observed that Bacon claimed that his age was witnessing a new power to unravel the secrets of nature, and this
new power was a consequence of the new scientific method
(actually, a reformed inductive method). And one of the
ends of this new scientific and technological knowledge was
"the endowment of human life with new inventions and
riches" (in Warhaft, 1965:354).
Bacon's position is a very general form of the material
well-being model. This model can be given more specific form,
and one of the most popular variants of the position links
scarcity, technology, and man's material well-being. Edward
Bellamy's Looking Backward 2000-1887 (in Elliott, 1966)
presents a classic statement of this argument. Bellamy constructs a technocratic utopia in which the planning, production, and distribution of goods is accomplished by an elaborate
social and economic machine. Bellamy'S utopia is technological not only in the sense that it is a society filled with
gadgets and machines, but also in the extended sense that the
society is based on a high degree of rational organization in
the name of efficiency. The organization of society is like a
large machine in which personnel are components. Bellamy
(in Elliott, 1966:170) has Dr. Leete, one of the principal
characters in the novel, compare the older order to the new:
The ancien regime, Leete observes, may be likened to "the
military efficiency of a mob, or a horde of barbarians with a
thousand petty chiefs, as compared with that of a disciplined
army under one general-such a fighting machine, for example, as the German army in the time of Von Moltke." Julian
West, the narrator of the novel, agrees with this analogy. In a
nightmare in which he dreams that he had returned to the old
order, he observes (in Elliott, 1966: 194) a military parade, and
reflects that "here at last were order and reason, an exhibition
of what intelligent cooperation can accomplish." He sees the
passing regiment not as individuals, but as a "tremendous
engine ... able to vanquish a mob ten times as numerous."
And he asks himself why the citizens of the old order "fail
to compare the scientific manner in which the nation went
to war with the unscientific manner in which it went to
work?"
This new production machine will, according to Bellamy
(in Elliott, 1966), virtually abolish scarcity. Over the entrance
to the distribution center --a huge department-store-like
institution -stands "a majestic life-size group of statuary, the
central figure of which was a female ideal of Plenty, with her
cornucopia" (p. 194). Dr. Leete (p. 112) observes that "as
regards the great staples of life, of which an abundance can
always be secured, scarcity is eliminated as a factor. There
is always a great surplus kept on hand from which any fluctuations of demand or supply can be corrected, even in most
cases of bad crops." And it is clear that in Bellamy's scheme
this abundance is a result of the great technological machine
of production.
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This construction of a chain between technology, scarcity,
and progress has many weak links. First, technology is only
one of a network of factors which are necessary to reduce
scarcity. The way the economic,' social, and political system
distributes goods is also a primary factor in ameliorating man's
material estate. And we have no basis for claiming that this
ensemble of factors is moving, over the long run, toward the
material improvement of the human condition.
But a second difficulty is even more telling. One of the
phenomena of modern technology is the power to expand
man's wants constantly. Galbraith (1958, 1967, 1974) has
argued tirelessly that modern capitalism, through mass advertising (a type of technology), is able both to manipulate and
expand human wants continually. And we might add that it
is also technology in the form of mass production which
makes possible the satisfaction of each new level of wants.
But is there any basis for claiming that this continual
creation and satisfaction of wants is progressive? Galbraith
(1967) points out that many wants which are created and
satisfied are trivial and goods while "public goods" go unmet.
Technological, capitalist economies produce videotape machines, synthetic foods, and recreation vehicles, while public
transportation, housing, and the environment suffer. At this
point it might be objected that to call synthetic foods trivial
goods and public transportation public goods is to beg the
question. This assumes a hierarchy of wants, and this involves
a value judgment. What is ultimately at issue is the question
of what constitutes the Good Life, and it is obviously beyond
our scope here to discuss this question. But perhaps we can
circumvent this perennial question by making a distinction
between types of needs and wants.
The basic cut that seems to be required in any discussion
of wants and needs is between basic biological needs and nonbiological or conditioned wants and needs. The former are the
basic requirements for physical survival-food, minimal shelter, and perhaps companionship. The latter are all those needs
which are a product of one's particular society and culture.
The class of non-biological wants and needs can be further subdivided into subsistence needs and luxurious needs. Subsistence needs are those which must be fulfilled to live a minimally decent life in a specific society. These will obviously
vary greatly from society to society. A minimally decent
life in the United States is drastically different from a minimally decent life in Rwanda, eastern Africa. All needs beyond
subsistence may be classified as luxurious needs-albeit some
luxurious needs (e.g., a color television in the United States)
will be much closer to subsistence needs than others (e.g., a
Mercedes Benz in the United States) (see Gendron, 1977:
216-219).
The relevance of this discussion to the question of the role

of technology in progress toward material well-being is the
following. We may say minimally that technology has been
progressive with respect to playing a crucial role in potentially
fulfilling man's basic needs. Admittedly, millions of people in
the world are still undernourished and suffering from curable
diseases; but these are caused by the other part of that ensemble which we mentioned above, and not by the nature of
deficiencies of technology. Technology because of its power
over nature has the ability to fulfill man's basic needs, and
the desirability of filling basic biological needs seems to be
beyond question even by the most skeptical ethicians.
But whether technology is progressive in fulfilling man's
non-biological needs and wants is entirely dependent on value
judgments. It is at this point that the critics of technology
bring in their lists of social ills caused either directly or indirectly by technology-pollution, compulsive consumption,
resource depletion, alienated work, mass advertising, and so
on. It is beyond our present purposes to discuss these so-called
"negative effects" of technology. The conclusion that may be
drawn is that the determination of whether technology is progressive with respect to man's material well-being is, as soon as
we leave the area of basic biological needs, a matter of a value
judgment, and such judgment is extrinsic to technology. But
technology is potentially and intrinsically - because of its
power to manipulate nature - progressive with respect to fulfilling man's basic biological needs.
2. Moral and Spiritual Well-being Models
If the modern age can no longer say with assurance that
technology is steadily and irreversibly increasing man's material well-being, then is there any sense in which it can say that
technology is increasing man's moral and spiritual well-being?
A common Enlightenment theory of moral and spiritual
progress through science and technology was one which linked
science and technology to knowledge of moral, social, and
economic truths. Diderot (in Passmore, 1970:205) capsulized
this position in his famous statement that "we are criminals
only because we judge wrongly."
There are some classic difficulties with this position. Even
if one holds a rationalistic ethic (what we ought to do is what
is reasonable), it does not follow that we will be good. Reason
may tell us what we ought to do, but what we actually do is
another matter. The mistake of the Enlightenment authors is
not their linking of reason and virtue, but rather the necessity
which they claim is present between the two - the assertion
that if we see what is reasonable we will do it.
A more modern variant of the moral and spiritual wellbeing model is the position which draws a connection between
scarcity, technology, and moral and spiritual well-being. We
saw an attempt to draw such a linkage in our discussion of
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the material well-being model. A similar argument is frequently applied to moral and spiritual well-being. Bellamy (in
Elliott, 1966) may be taken as one source of this position. In
addition to the already-mentioned argument that technology
would bring about a material cornucopia, Bellamy also argued
that technology's ability to overcome scarcity will bring with
it the promise of a just society. Julian West, the main character in Bellamy's Looking Backward states regarding the new
order:
The nation is rich and does not wish the people to
deprive themselves of any good thing. In your day,
men were bound to lay up goods and money against
coming failure of the means of support and for their
children. This necessity made parsimony a virtue.
But now it would have no such laudable object, and,
having lost its utility, it has ceased to be regarded as a
virtue. No man any more has any care for the morrow,
either for himself or his children, for the nation guarantees the nature, education, and comfortable maintenance of every citizen from the cradle to the grave
(in Elliott, 1966: 54-5 5).
In the new order, technology has overcome scarcity, which
heretofore was the principal motive for storing up riches.
Thus, the new abundance has, for the first time in history,
made possible "the equal wealth and equal opportunities of
culture which all persons now enjoy ..." (in Elliott, 1966:95).
In fact, Bellamy in a burst of enthusiasm, even expanded
this argument to include other virtues.
In your day [West argues, speaking about the old
order 1 fully nineteen twentieths of the crime, using
the word broadly to include all sorts of misdemeanors, resulted from the inequality in the possessions of
individuals; want tempted the poor, lust of greater
gains, or the desire to preserve former gains, tempted
the well-to-do. Directly or indirectly, the desire for
money, which then meant every good thing, was the
motive of all this crime, the taproot of a vast poison
growth ... (in Elliott, 1966: 122).
But the new order "cut this root" by "abolishing want" and
"checking the accumulation of riches" (in Elliott, 1966: 122).
And, of course, the abolishing of want was accomplished by
technology. In brief, the abolition of want through technology
was largely, although not entirely, responsible for abolishing
most crime and bringing about a just social order.
In addition to ushering in a virtuous society, Bellamy
argued. that technology can help man develop his "higher"
faculties-what we might call man's spiritual well-being.
Because of the technological, social machine (described in the
preceding section), members of the new order may retire at
forty-five so that they "can fully devote [themselves] to the
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higher exercise of [their] faculties, the intellectual and spiritual enjoyments and pursuits which alone mean life" (in
Elliott, 1966:118).
There are several standard objections to this position, but
we need note only two. First, only a few seem to be capable
of the enjoyment of "higher" pleasures. In fact, many persons,
perhaps even the majority, have no interest in pursuing the
cultivation of scholarly and artistic pursuits. Should such persons simply be dismissed as less fully developed persons than
the few who do enjoy the higher pleasures? Secondly, the
experience of Western societies in recent decades points to
the naivete of Bellamy's claim that scarcity is the source of
most social ills. Western Europe, Japan, the United States,
and Canada have achieved a level of abundance which is almost
utopian and yet social ills remain and seem even to worsen.
Whether we agree or disagree with the arguments of
Diderot and Bellamy, the main point that I would like to draw
from the survey of these two theories of moral and spiritual
progress through technology is that the theories depend upon
extrinsic goals. The production of material abundance, the
creation of a just society, and the cultivation of man's higher
faculties are all goals outside of the structure of technology.
Thus, whether technological change is interpreted as progress
in the direction of the moral and spiritual betterment of mankind is a matter of the values chosen by an individual or
ascribed to by a society.
CONCLUSION
In closing, I wish to examine briefly the implication of
this study of the idea of technological progress on the meansuse model of technology. This model states that technology
is a neutral means; whether it is used for good or evil purposes
is not a matter of the nature of technology itself, but rather of
how man uses it. This model is immensely popular. Schumacher (1973: 156) assumed it when he called for a change in the
direction of technology: "[We] are deeply convinced that
technological development has taken a wrong turn and needs
to be redirected." Similarly, Pacey (1974:309) stated that
"the problem [with technology] ... is to define new directions for technical progress in which there is a promise for the
future - to decide on objectives for scientific and technological
development which carry more conviction than many existing
ones." The continuing popularity of this means-use model is
indicated by two recent studies of the history of technology.
Cardwell (1972:223) stated that
It is not technology that threatens our society and its

values. For technology is itself a distinctive and dependent offspring of the philosophy, cosmology, and
religion of that society. Technology is a highly rdined
instrument, although like all instruments it may be
mis-applied.
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And Pacey (I974:309) argued that "the crucial point is that
the direction of progress [Pacey is referring primarily to technological progress] is always a matter of choice."

water-clocks were not a prominent enough feature
of their lives to affect the way in which they conceived the relation between themselves and the world.

The means-use model has an unsettlingly facile and
simplistic ring to it. Is the movement of technology simply a
matter of man's choice? Is technology always a means or only
sometimes? Does technology contain a direction which is, at
least to some degree, outside of the control of man? If it does,
then the means-use model, at least in its pure form, is invalid.
Finally, we may ask a further question: If technology does
contain an internal direction, then is this direction progressive ~i.e., is it moving toward betterment?

But with the Renaissance, technology began to playa greater
role in man's life (Collingwood, 1945 :9):

We saw that for the most part our answer to both the
question concerning intrinsic direction and the question of
whether this direction is progressive was negative. Since there
is no intrinsic direction to technology, the cumulative model
cannot be applied to technology. The problem-solving model
of technology seems to be valid for the immediate, shortterm solution of a problem, but it cannot be applied to the
long-run movement of technology. The material well-being
model does seem to work for the potential fulfillment of
man's basic biological needs, but it fails once we move beyond
these needs. Finally, there is nothing in the nature of technology which moves technology inexorably toward man's
moral and spiritual improvement.

Finally, Winner (1977) argued that the contemporary world
has witnessed another quantum jump in the development of
technology - the jump to large-scale technological systems.
Such systems are "networks of highly advanced development
--systems characterized by a large size, concentration, extension, and the complex interconnection of a great number of
artificial and human parts" (Winner, 1977 :238). These systems, in contrast to earlier technologies, "do not respond
positively to human guidance" (Winner, 1977 :227). "Beyond
a certain level of technological development, the rule of freelyarticulated, strongly-asserted purposes is a luxury that can no
longer be permitted" (Winner, 1977 :238). Winner formulated
a new phrase to describe the dynamics of large-scale technological systems - "reverse adaption," and he described (Winner,
1977 :227) this phenomenon as follows:

Our analysis of technological progress suggests, then, that
the means-use model of technology is essentially valid. There
does not appear to be any internal direction to technology,
much less any internal direction which is progressive~except
for the minimal senses of short-term moving toward the solution of a problem and the promise of fulfilling man's basic
biological needs.
But we have examined the means-use model only from
the viewpoint of logical analysis of models of technological
progress. There are, of course, other perspectives from which
the means-use model can be viewed. Perhaps one of the most
important is with respect to the degree that technology plays
a role in human life. I...et us briefly examine where this approach might lead.
A strong case can be made, I believe, for the thesis that in
earlier times the means-use model was an accurate description of man's relation to technology, but that this model is
becoming increasingly inaccurate, especially with the advent
of large-scale technological systems. Collingwood (1945 :8)
has noted that machines did not playa central role in the lives
of the Greeks and Romans:
The Greeks and Romans were not machine users
except to a very small extent; their catapults and

The Renaissance view of nature ... (is partly) ...
based on the human experience of designing and
constructing machines .... By the sixteenth century
. .. the printing press and the windmill, the pump
and the pulley, the clock ... were established features of daily life. Everyone understood the nature of
a machine ....

The goals, purposes, needs, and decisions that are
supposed to determine what technologies do are in
important instances no longer the true source of their
direction. Technical systems become severed from the
ends originally set for them, and, in effect, reprogram
themselves and their environment to suit the special
conditions of their own operation. The artificial slave
gradually subverts the rule of the master.
Winner offered this theory as an alternative to the theory
espoused by Mills (1956) and Galbraith (1967), among others,
that technical elites are the real rulers in a technological
society. Winner argued, by contrast, that large-scale technological systems take on a life of their own, and that human
ends are forced to conform to these ends. He offered numerous
illustrations of this phenomenon, and I shall cite only a few.
First, in large, technically-oriented societies, people "come to
accept the norms and standards of technical processes as
central to their lives as a whole" (Winner, 1977 :229, italics
mine). Efficiency, for example, is no longer applied only to
the office or assembly line, but to pleasure, leisure, learning,
and reading (witness the popularity of speed-reading courses).
Another illustration of the autonomy of large-scale technical
systems is the tendency for these systems to develop new
missions after the original mission for which the system was
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developed has been fulfilled. The technological tool is not
retired. Rather, the system may "take direct action to extend
its control over the ends themselves" (Winner, 1977 :24 I).
For example, NASA has flown men to the moon. What shall it
do now? The agency has proposed many new projects: the
space shuttle; exploration of Mars, Venus, and Jupiter; and
asteriod space-colonies. The argument frequently used to support the continuation of NASA is that such a magnificent
aerospace team should not be dismantled.
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In sum, the line of argument here is that technologies in
earlier times were responsive to man's control. But with the
introduction of large-scale technologies, this is no longer the
case. Winner argued further that originally all technologies are
purposive, even large-scale technological systems. Large-scale
systems come into existence as a result of conscious decisions
by men. But the control of these systems by man tends to
decrease as the systems grow and as they become a more
integral part of human life.
This position is consistent with the general conclusion
which we drew from our logical analysis of models of technological progress. We argued that technology does not contain any inherent direction; the direction of technology, and
by that fact also its progressiveness, are contingent on man's
choices. This offers at least some grounds for being optimistic
about the future direction of technology.
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